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SOUNDS OF SILENCE: THE SUPREME COURT

AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Adam Winkler*
I.

INTRODUCMION

Judges "speak" in a variety of fashions, from addressing litigants
or jurors in open court,1 to making statements to the general public
outside of the courthouse. 2 Arguably the most fundamental form of
judicial speech is that contained in judicial opinions, where judges offer public justification for their decisions and help to maintain a selfgoverning society by enabling "We the People" to discern, critique,
and debate the reasons given for judicial acts.3 Opportunities to
speak, however, can also be opportunities to remain silent. Language
is the lifeblood of the law, but language is capable of diversion in lieu
of focus, obfuscation instead of revelation. Moreover, the decision of
what to say inevitably sacrifices other potentially significant considerations, perspectives, and issues which remain unspoken. When judges
speak, there is also often judicial silence 4
* B.S.F.S., 1990, Georgetown University; J.D., 1993, New York University. I am
grateful for the thoughtful suggestions and necessary proddings of Melissa Bomes, Mitch
Duneier, Ken Karst, Estelle Lau, Laurie Levenson, and James Zagel.
1. See Christopher N. May, What Do We Do Now?: Helping Juries to Apply the Instructions, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 869 (1995).
2. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Is It the Siren's Call?: Judges and Free Speech While Cases
Are Pending, 28 Lot. L.A. L. REv. 831 (1995); Gregory C. O'Brien, Jr., Speech May Be
Free, and Talk Cheap, but Judges Can Pay a Heavy Pricefor Unguarded Expression, 28
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 815 (1995). One way in which judges "speak" that can easily go unnoticed is by their environments, sending signifying messages of authority and objectivity
through their raised benches and colorless uniforms. For an examination of what judges
communicate by their stark black robes, see James B. Zagel & Adam Winkler, The Independence of Judges, 46 MERCER L. REv. (forthcoming 1995).
3. See STEPHEN MACEDO, LmnnE . ViRTuEs: CITzENsHiP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNrry in LIBERAL CoNsrrtrioNALisM (1990) (arguing that liberal democracy depends on
norms of public justification and reason-giving by judiciary in particular, and government
in general).
4. [Communication] is all about the production of ideas, images, and cultural representations, but it also selectively silences efien as it creates. Like all artistic
expression, it is a crafting process of production and negation, in the same way
that a painting may involve choices to include yellow and blue while leaving out
red and green.
Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC-Regrouping in Singular Times, 104
HARV. L. Rev. 525, 537 (1990).
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The Supreme Court's decisions on race-based affirmative action
amply illustrate this phenomenon. If in the context of affirmative action the topics of race and America's racial history seem inevitable, 5
the Court has steered the constitutional conversation away from race
and towards something else. If we explore the reasoning and rhetoric
of the Court in three of the most significant affirmative action casesRegents of the University of Californiav. Bakke,6 City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.,7 and the recent decision in Shaw v. Reno 8 -we find
that instead of talking about race and its role in American society,
history, and constitutionalism, the Court diverts attention by placing
institutions at the center of the debate. The Court analyzes the constitutional dilemmas of affirmative action predominately in terms of institutions. Throughout the cases the reasoning of the Court turns on
how particular issues affect, distract, or fit into existing institutional
arrangements and institutional practices. Race consciousness, when
allowed, is permitted because of institutional reasons-that is, that result is dictated by the Justices' ideas and beliefs about various institutions in our society. How race-conscious policies and laws can be
structured and implemented is also guided by the Court's institutional
concerns and understandings. As a result the contours of constitutional doctrine on affirmative action are not determined by the demands of racial justice, but by the ability of racial preferences to fit
into current institutional regimes.
The Court's emphasis on institutions in its reasoning and rhetoric
instead of more explicit focus on racial considerations is problematic.
Not only does the Court's reliance on institutional concerns obscure
5. This Article focuses on affirmative action primarily aimed to advantage blacks.
The extensive and devastating subordination of blacks is unparalleled in American history,
and thus lies at the heart of the affirmative action dilemma. Although focusing on blacks
risks marginalizing other minority groups, few would deny that the experience of blacks is
unique and deserves focused attention. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of
Quotasin Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1043,
1072-73. Moreover, progress on the racial front will likely lead to substantial advancement
with regard to other subordinated minorities.
Aspects of the analysis here would resonate to a certain extent with affirmative action
for women, though the Court has tended to take a more deferential view of benign or
compensatory gender classifications. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)
(upholding Social Security benefit formula that extended greater benefits to females than
to males on justification that law compensated for historical discrimination in wages). But
see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (invalidating nursing school
admission policy favoring women applicants).
6. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
8. 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).
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the central issues of race involved and of America's racial past inherent in the affirmative action controversy, but it also rests on unquestioned and unexamined premises. The Court presumes the
institutions and institutional practices it defers to are neutral, natural,
and necessary, failing to recognize how those structures are themselves the product of a contingent social context. The social environment in which institutions arise impinges upon and shapes those
regimes and operations. Yet the Court bases its reasoning on idealized versions of American institutions, decontextualized from the real
world of American experience. Consequently, the Court does not notice how the general attitudes of prejudice and racism in society infect
and infiltrate the very institutions to which the Court defers. If racism
has contaminated the structure and operation of institutions, then
there is considerably less reason to accord them deference, at least in
their current condition.
Emphasis on institutions in place of issues of race also causes the
Court's reasoning to become entangled and incoherent, shifting from
one case to the next as the Court becomes lost due to its effort to
avoid the central issues of race involved in affirmative action. A close
examination reveals that in each case the Court actually reasons from
different premises, reorders its priorities, and betrays deep inconsistencies with the earlier affirmative action precedents. While consistently themed around the subject of institutions, the opinions
continually reinterpret, reshape, and reconfigure the institutional
moorings upon which earlier decisions were based.
The purpose of this Article is to show how the Court's most significant affirmative action decisions are guided by institutions and notions of institutionality, and to highlight the problems engendered by
this approach. The Article carefully examines the lead opinions of
Bakke, Croson, and Shaw, revealing the institutional discourses underlying them and the inconsistencies and illogics within them. To rebut the institutional arguments put forth by the Court, an alternative
discourse centered explicitly on race is offered. This alternative discourse is not intended to be complete or uncontroversial. Rather it
serves as a useful foil to dissect the Court's arguments and expose the
premises that go unquestioned. The goal here is decidedly critical; I
do not seek to resolve the issue of affirmative action's constitutionality
or answer every conceivable question that could be raised.9 The alter9. It may be that the debate over the legal status of affirmative action is "outmoded"
with little hope of an edifying resolution because the debaters have reached an impenetrable deadlock and the political will to create race-conscious remedies is not strong enough
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native discourse effectively highlights the logical flaws and incongruities of the Court's affirmative action decisions.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II briefly considers the
theoretical framework used to understand and categorize the cases,
explaining in more detail what it means to say that the Court has emphasized "institutions" and "institutional concerns" in its reasoning.
Part III analyzes the three affirmative action cases, probing to uncover
the Court's reliance throughout on notions and understandings about
institutions. This Part also underscores the problematic nature of analyzing affirmative action in terms of institutions by identifying the tensions created by institutional discourse and offering an alternative
discourse that brings racial issues directly to bear. This alternative discourse critiques the Court's decisions by giving voice to a few of the
things left silent by the Court's rhetoric and reasoning of
institutionality.

II.

TALKING ABOUT INSTITUTIONS

Affirmative action is essentially the use of race consciousness in a
preferential manner intended not to stigmatize, but to provide a modicum of equality to members of those groups that historically have
been the victims of discrimination and subordination. Affirmative action can take a variety of different forms, ranging from programs to
hire more minorities at workplaces to multiculturalism in education
and elsewhere.10 Each takes into account race in an effort to promote
racial equality in a society beset by racial inequity. Because affirmative action laws and policies purposefully consider race, some have
challenged affirmative action adopted by government by asserting that
racial classifications violate their constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws.
Over the past twenty years, the Court has considered several
challenges to affirmative action under the constitutional guise of the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee,11 crafting a
to support widespread affirmative action. See Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate
over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 893 (1994). If this is true, then there may be no
reason to continue making positive, as compared to critical, arguments regarding affirmative action's constitutionality.
10. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTI-CULTURALISM AND "THE
PoLITcs oF RECOGNITON" 25 (1992) (discussing bases and consequences of politics of
"equal recognition" wherein previously marginalized peoples are encouraged to assert
their authentic identities).
11. The equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
which has been read to be the substantive equivalent of the Fourteenth Amendment's

Aril~ 1995]

SOUNDS OF SILENCE

doctrine in which affirmative action can pass constitutional muster,
though just barely and not too often. Three cases represent the major
doctrinal events in the course of the Supreme Court's constitutional
affirmative action jurisprudence. 2 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke13 was the Court's first full consideration of affirmative
action. 4 Justice Lewis Powell's solo opinion, announcing the judgment of the Court, applied strict scrutiny to racial classifications by
the state and set the stage-the scenery, the actors, and the themesfor the Court's later treatment of race consciousness intended to benefit otherwise disadvantaged minorities. The Court coalesced a majority around the strict scrutiny standard in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.,'s where Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion for the
Court reshaped the doctrinal foundations laid in Bakke. Shaw v.
Reno16 is the most recent and perhaps most revolutionary of the affirmative action cases, throwing open issues already settled by the earlier decisions. Taken together, these three cases-and their
interpretations of other affirmative action precedents-establish the
basic constitutional doctrine regarding race-based affirmative action
adopted by the states. But it is an inconsistently developed doctrine,
each case appearing to build on the others but in fact remolding earlier decisions and their arguments, and ultimately reformulating the
constitutional status of affirmative action.
These cases establish the shaky foundations of affirmative action
doctrine by focusing myopically on "institutions." In other words, the
Court is led to a particular result at each doctrinal turn because of a
concern with, or understanding of, one or more institutions in society.
Institutions, simply defined, are structural organizations of rules and
equal protection guarantee, governs affirmative action laws adopted by the federal government. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 455 (1980).
12. Excluded from this discussion is affirmative action adopted by private employers,
the legality of which is determined by reference to federal law-Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. V 1993)-not the Constitution. See,
e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (upholding private affirmative
action plans). Federal affirmative action laws are not the central focus of this Article, but
the role of Congress in affirmative action is explored through analysis of Croson'sinterpretation of Fullove. See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
13. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
14. Several years before Bakke, the Court refused to consider the constitutionality of
the University of Washington Law School's preferential admissions program for members
of racial and ethnic minorities, ruling instead that because the law school had admitted the
white plaintiff subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit, the complaint was moot. See
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974).
15. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
16. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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relationships that persist over time. They can be either "formal" or
"informal." That is, they may have some formal official status in society as evidenced by an identifiable body and/or charter-for example,
a corporation, a bureaucracy, or a branch of government. They may
also arise informally out of culture or routine social interaction, such
as rules of etiquette or language. We are mainly concerned here with
formal institutions because they
are the ones emphasized by the
17
rhetoric.
and
reasoning
Court's
The Court's decisions revolve around four basic institutional concepts. The first is the existence of a mandate that requires race consciousness; only where the Court can say that the core mission of a
particular institution is furthered by adopting affirmative action measures will race consciousness be constitutionally permissible. The second institutional concept the Court relies upon is functionality, the
ability of an institution to carry out its mission in an effective manner.
If affirmative action can be said to interfere with the operation of an
institution, its practices, and objectives, then race consciousness will
not be allowed to stand. Third, the Court shows a forceful concern for
traditional institutional decision-making processes. Even where the
Court allows race consciousness, the institution involved cannot enable race to corrupt the traditional way in which the institution has
distributed burdens or benefits. Finally, understandings about the
symbolic role of institutions in society influence the Court's reasoning.
At times the Court reasons from the premise that institutional arrangements play an important role in shaping how we look at the
world, and that institutions must therefore strive to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people-legitimacy that derives from adherence to traditional institutional procedures and practices. One of
these four concepts controls the resolution of most of the significant
issues the Court deals with in the course of deciding affirmative action
cases, although the Court consistently reinterprets and reforms the institutional conceptions on which it relies.
17. My definition of "institutions"-formal or informal-does not purport to be complete. I seek only to capture the essential features to make use of the term understandable.
For a more nuanced view of formal institutions, see Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek,
Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a "New Institutionalism," in Tim DYNAMIcS
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 311 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Calvin Jillson eds., 1994). In explaining

the "impinging, interactive, and contingent character" of institutions, Orren and
Skowronek describe other fundamental features of particularly political institutions.
Among others, these features include purposiveness-how institutions are organized with
reference to specific goals-and otherdirectedness-how institutions influence and control
the behavior of people outside of the institutions themselves. See id. at 323-29.
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The Court talks about a variety of different institutions and institutional settings. For instance, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke turns
fundamentally on his conceptions of two institutions: the judiciary
and the university. 8 In Croson, the Court bases its reasoning on understandings of Congress as an institution, though the Court also emphasizes the institutional role of state agencies.' 9 In Shaw, the
institutional concerns guiding the Court are the electoral institutions
of the states and the state legislative bodies. 20 What links these various settings is their institutionality-the way they are understood as
organized, established structures in society with certain specified
roles, regulations, and operating procedures.
In one sense institutional concerns are destined to influence affirmative action law because institutions tend to be the bodies adopting affirmative action measures. It is no surprise therefore that the
Court talks about the university or the state legislature as institutions
when dealing with race-conscious policies of universities or legislatures. What is surprising about the Court's decisions is the extent to
which institutional concerns drive, not just influence, the Court's analysis. 2 ' Virtually every significant doctrinal point turns on an argument
about institutions. Each question the Court asks-from what level of
scrutiny should apply to how precedents should be interpreted-is answered by an implicit understanding or view of some institution and
its practices.
Even if the breadth of the Court's reliance on institutions was not
itself problematic, there are several reasons to condemn the dominance of institutions in the Court's reasoning. The Court tends to obscure significant racial considerations, such as the depth of America's
troubled racial history and current pervasive inequality. Unspoken in
the Court's decisions are the endemic social, political, and economic
18. See infra part III.A.
19. See infra part III.B.
20. See infra part III.C.
21. It is beyond the scope of this Article to test the nature and scope of institutionsoriented analysis in the entirety of equal protection doctrine. Yet, it might be helpful to
indicate an area in which, by contrast, institutions do not play as overwhelming a role as
they do in race-based affirmative action. A good example would be gender discrimination
cases, where institutional concerns are peripheral to the central discussions of the Court
regarding the relationships between the sexes. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975) (discussing outdated conceptions of female role in society); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (discussing relationship of husband and wife, and social stereotypes of

women). This is not to say that institutional concerns never play a role in gender casesfar from it. See, eg., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (emphasizing institutional
needs of military). Institutional concerns in gender discrimination cases just do not dominate the way they do in race-based affirmative action cases.
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inequalities that still beset our society, dividing us into virtually "two
nations"-one white, one black.22 Moreover, the experiences and
perspectives of members of historically subordinated groups are not
brought to bear in the decisions.23
Perhaps more disconcerting still is the superficial neutrality of
current institutional arrangements. Deference to institutions as they
presently operate in society is not called for when the institutions
themselves are tainted by racism. Such deference may be similarly
inappropriate whenever an institution or its practices serves to exacerbate racial inequality or perpetuate existing racial subordination. Yet
the Court assumes the neutrality and impartiality of institutions without questioning its own premises. The Court often isolates the institution it analyzes from its real world context, abstracting an institutional
ideal from the social reality in which the institution must operate. Yet,
our institutions are enmeshed in a larger social fabric of attitudes and
actions, whose strands impinge upon, restrict, and pattern institutional
arrangements. As a result of the Court's idealized versions of institutions, it fails to notice the way racism and American racial attitudes
influence some of those very institutions and challenge our allegiance
to the traditional practices and features of institutional regimes.
The Court's focus on institutions also leads to inconsistent and
incongruent results. Not only does the Court suddenly and surprisingly switch from one institution to another in its reasoning, but its
understanding of what is important with regard to any particular institution or institutional practice also shifts from case to case. For instance, the Court's reasoning at one point may turn on the Justices'
understanding of some institutional concept, such as the mandate of
the body adopting affirmative action. Yet, in the next case the Court
is liable to consider persuasive a completely different type of institutional mandate, or perhaps even ignore the existence of similar man22. See generally ANDREw HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992) (detailing economic, educational, and wealth chasms between
blacks and whites that mark American life). On the lingering effects of America's racial
history, see Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REv. 828,

840-58 (1983).
23. Mari J. Matsuda has popularized the phrase "looking to the bottom" to describe a

process of critically interpreting social phenomena from the vantage point of those who
have been excluded historically from power, such as people of color and women. See Mar
J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. RFv. 323, 324-26 (1987). Bringing to bear these perspectives helps to reveal

the forms by which power relations in society are maintained. Just as essential is how such
perspectives open-up dialogues and help us better test our own beliefs about "truth." See
Matsuda, supra.
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dates altogether. As a consequence of such inconsistencies, the
doctrine the Court has established is entangled in vines of the Court's
own creation.
Although troublesome, the institutional orientation of the Court
and the racial silences it encourages are not wholly incomprehensible.
When the subject is race, silence can often be expected from judges
and, indeed, from most Americans. We live in a society where speaking forthrightly about issues of race is often unacceptable as a matter
of etiquette. Talking openly and honestly about race is taboo. Even
though race is at the core of many legal and political dilemmas, such
as affirmative action, a code of manners has developed that attempts
to get beyond race by pushing it into the background. As with any
code of etiquette, the etiquette of racial discourse imposes limits on
what we can say and how we can say it, and ultimately what we think
about and how we prioritize. Because of etiquette, silences and gaps
when we talk about race are far too common 2 4 But just as they are
routine, they often go unnoticed and unexamined. Etiquette is most
effective when it works on the level of the subconscious, shaping behavior even when we are not cognizant of it. When we have fully
internalized the rules and codes of social relations, we begin to act
upon them without any cognizance of our doing so. We cease to reflect on them, following them blindly, thereby entrenching and reproducing those forms of interaction and manners of expression.
The etiquette of racial discourse and the silences it produces arise
in part out of white guilt and black suspicion. White Americans often
attempt to avoid discussions of race out of a sense of shame for the
sins of their forefathers and a desire not to offend. Even the most
conscientious white person in a public place is likely to revert to a
hushed whisper just to utter the word "black" if the subject of a black
person's race comes up. Meanwhile, black Americans often harbor
suspicions when whites do talk about racial issues, fearing the subconscious furthering of racist ideology by even well intentioned whites. It
becomes "politically incorrect" for whites to discuss racial issues.
24. A poignant illustration of how we hesitate to talk about racial topics can be found
in a recent issue of The New Republic, which included a symposium on the 1994 book The
Bell Curve by Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein. See Symposium, Race & LQ., NEw
REPuBLiC, Oct. 31, 1994, at 4. Murray and Herrnstein concluded that differences in I.Q.
between blacks and whites are genetic, raising the spectre of blacks being biologically "inferior" to whites. The Issue, NEw R'PuBUC, Oct. 31, 1994, at 9. Although hotly debated
in the mass media, the subject caused the editors of The New Republic to write an apology
for even discussing the book, despite the fact that the issue contained numerous scathingand persuasive-attacks on the book and its theory. Id
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Though blacks may feel free to deal with race explicitly, both whites
and blacks contribute to an environment where we as a society cannot
approach racial issues with the type of openness and honesty necessary to resolve our racial dilemmas. Silence, or simply changing the
topic, will not lead us to racial justice.
But no matter how much we might try, we cannot avoid completely the issue of race in America; our shared history sees to that.
The disjunction between our aspirational political ethos of equality
and freedom on the one hand, and our savage history of slavery and
caste on the other, remains unresolved. Our society is still beset by
endemic racial inequalities in terms of wealth, education, and political
power.' Racial identity continues to carry with it an inhibiting stigma
of inferiority. And, of course, the political and legal dilemmas involving race continue to ensnare us, constantly bringing race to the fore.
When combined with a silencing code of racial etiquette, the dilemmas worsen for we are made to deal with racial issues by talking
around them rather than addressing them head on. This is what appears to have happened to the Court; the Justices shape and contour
constitutional doctrine on race-conscious affirmative action by placing
institutions and institutional concerns instead of race at the center of
the debate. It just may be that the Court is mirroring general societal
trends, such as the code of racial etiquette, when it focuses on
institutions.
III.

AFrmnMArivE ActiON, INsTrTUTIONS, AND THE COURT

This part analyzes the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the core
decisions on the constitutionality of state-sponsored affirmative action. It reveals how the Court's direction is influenced by conceptions
of institutions and institutionality. Each of the three cases considered-Bakke, Croson, and Shaw-are taken up case-by-case in their
historical progression. This approach reveals the specific steps in the
Court's arguments, opening them up to critique and challenge by an
alternative discourse emphasizing race and America's racial history.
It also highlights the false evolution of affirmative action doctrine, illuminating where seeming continuities are in fact two ideas at odds or,
at least, in disharmony. We will witness how institutional threads are
woven throughout the doctrine, yet each seeming to change color and
pattern depending on the particular case.
25. See

HACKER,

supra note 22, at 93-146.
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In the Beginning: Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke

All conversations on the constitutional doctrine of affirmative action begin with Justice Powell's solo opinion announcing the judgment
of the Court in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke.26 Justice Powell laid the groundwork for the doctrine with regard to standards of review, guiding principles, and fundamental concerns. It was
Justice Powell who initiated the focus on institutions and first betrayed
noticeable silences to more explicitly racial issues.
In Bakke the Court held unconstitutional the University of California at Davis (U.C. Davis) medical school's affirmative action plan,
which provided racial and ethnic minority applicants27 with a separate
admissions procedure under which the school reserved a prescribed
number of places in the entering class for disadvantaged minorities.2
Alan Bakke, a white applicant whom the school had rejected two
years in a row, filed suit alleging that the university violated the equal
protection guarantee by not considering him for the reserved slots
solely on the basis of his race.29
The first significant constitutional question Justice Powell addressed was the level of scrutiny that should apply under equal protection to the medical school's admission program. Justice Powell
argued that the strict scrutiny standard was appropriate for all racebased classifications, regardless of who was burdened or benefited by
the classification. 31 To make this argument, Justice Powell first had to
overcome Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's equal protection principle as
envisioned in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
Co. 32 Footnote four of Carolene Products created the framework for
the Court's equal protection jurisprudence in the modern age by establishing varying levels of judicial scrutiny to specific types of legislative classifications. Although legislatures must always classify in
26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
27. The admissions policy stated that it applied to all "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" applicants, not simply to racial and ethnic minorities. Id. at 272 n.1.
The Court noted, however, that in practice only racial or ethnic minority applicants received recommendations through the separate admission procedure. Id. at 276.

28. Id at 275.
29. Id at 277-78.
30. Prior to reaching the constitutional question, Justice Powell addressed whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988), proscribed only those
racial classifications violative of the Equal Protection Clause. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281-

87.
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295-99.
32. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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writing laws, Justice Stone wrote that some laws may deserve more
scrutiny-or less deference-by the judicial branch than others.33
Laws dealing with economic regulation ought to be subject to less judicial oversight than those which either limit fundamental political
rights, such as the right to vote, or discriminate against "discrete and
insular minorities, ' 3 4 such as blacks. Subjecting laws discriminating
against blacks to exacting scrutiny is motivated by the recognition that
such a discrete and insular minority is likely to lack sufficient political
representation in government to safeguard its interests against
majoritarian abuse." Of course whites are neither discrete nor insular, tending to dominate the political process rather than be victimized
by it. Consequently, under the CaroleneProducts rationale, laws discriminating against whites, such as U.C. Davis' affirmative action plan,
ought not receive strict scrutiny but some
level of judicial review that
36
is more deferential to the legislature.
Justice Powell avoided CaroleneProducts by giving voice to institutional concerns. Justice Powell's rejection of the CaroleneProducts
rationale turned on his concern for the smooth operation of the judiciary as an institution. Justice Powell argued that if the Court upheld
Justice Stone's theory, judges would not be able to perform adequately their institutional duty or function-competently adjudicating
cases and controversies. "[C]oncepts of 'majority' and 'minority' necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments ' 37 beyond the capacity of judges to classify and to distinguish. Such
concepts are inherently "transitory, ' 38 fluid, and subject to change as
populations shift and political power is continuously reorganized. As
a result, he said, judges would have to make difficult choices relying
on nothing more than the "ebb and flow of political forces ' '39 in order
to stay within the theory of CaroleneProducts. "The kind of variable
sociological and political analysis necessary" to determine who is a
"minority" under Justice Stone's approach "simply does not lie within
the judicial competence."40
Justice Powell's institutional argument is striking in its silences. If
opinions took pictorial form, this one would be of a desert landscape,
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.; see JoHN HART ELY, DEMocCY AND DismusT 151 (1980).
See ELY, supra note 35, at 170.

37. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295.
38. Id. at 298.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 297.
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in which the power and social status of the races are constantly shifting dunes of sands. Constructions of "majority" and "minority" represent the power arrangements of a brief moment in time, which will
most certainly be lifted and transformed come the next, inevitable
gust of wind. But this image does not conform with the historical reality of racial categories in America, where racial subordination has
been characterized by an unmistakable rigidity and inflexibility. Historically blacks have been a deeply oppressed minority, with never
more than a token share of social, economic, and political power.
While the white Anglo-Saxon majority has certainly grown at the margins to incorporate white ethnics,4 1 the dominant white majority has
stubbornly resisted the full inclusion of blacks. If the sands shift in
some places, in others they barely budge. The durability of American
racial subordination undermines Justice Powell's fear of shifting sands.
Even if the sands did shift significantly over the long term, Justice
Powell's concern for the institutional competence of judges to keep up
with such "transitory" moments was at odds with a sentiment he expressed earlier in the opinion when addressing how to interpret Title
VI, but to which he suddenly became silent. Just a few pages before,
he stated:
The concept of "discrimination" [under the language of Title
VI], like the phrase "equal protection of the laws," is susceptible of varying interpretations, for as Mr. Justice Holmes declared, "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged,
it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color
and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used."4'
Here, the problem of dynamic social and linguistic phenomena was
embraced by Justice Powell, reflecting a nuanced view of transition,
change, and the judicial function. Justice Powell conceded that part of
the basic requirements of being a judge was the ability to keep up with
changing interpretations and meanings of legal concepts and ideas.
Justice Powell's treatment of "discrimination" or "equal protection"
as distinct from the "concepts of 'majority' and 'minority'" is without
justification. It makes little sense to say that judges are incapable of
assessing which groups in society have suffered pervasive discrimina41. Some of these white ethnic groups, such as Irish and southern and eastern European immigrants who came to America around the turn of the twentieth century, faced

harsh, quasi-racial discrimination when they landed on our shores. See RoNALD TAKAXI,
A DEuurr MURROR 146-54, 277-310 (1993).

42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284 (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).
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tion, yet they can effectively keep up with the even more subjective
"living thought" of what equal protection means. Indeed, the Court's
view of equal protection has changed radically over the past centurybeginning in powerless dormancy and growing to constitutional vibrancy43-during which time the racial composition of the "majority"
has remained mostly static.
Justice Powell's concern for institutional functionality in terms of
judicial competence was also evidenced in his analysis of gender classifications. Although he stated at one point that a theoretical understanding of equal protection guided his choice of standard of review,
according to which no person or "special wards [are] entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others," 4 he later
strayed from this position and enhanced his institutions-based reasoning. When faced with the fact that under recent Supreme Court decisions gender classifications received special treatment in the form of
"intermediate" scrutiny 45-less than strict, but more than deferential
rational basis-Justice Powell said the same are "less likely to create
analytical and practical problems" for the judiciary such as those
posed by the majority/minority distinction.46 As a result gender classifications are "relatively manageable for reviewing courts." 47 The key
for Justice Powell was not a theoretical adversity to "special wards,"
but rather the ability of the institution of the judiciary to handle the
relevant classification in the performance of its tasks.
If Justice Powell defeated Justice Stone's theory of judicial review
from Carolene Products,his victory did not in itself provide a positive
43. The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection was "strangled in in-

fancy by post-civil war judicial reactionism." See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek,
The EqualProtectionof Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341,381 (1949). Fifty years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was able to characterize equal protection as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." See Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). In the postwar era the Court breathed life into the Equal

Protection Clause, and now commentators can correctly say that "the equal protection
guarantee has become the single most important concept in the Constitution for the protection of individual rights." See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTrru.
TIONAL LAW 568 (4th ed. 1991).
Justice Powell was obviously aware of the shifting sands of constitutional equal protection; indeed, he mentioned the various stages in equal protection's history. See Bakke, 438
U.S. at 291-92. Hence his reluctance to trust judges to determine who constitutes a minority or a majority is all the more surprising.
44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295.
45. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197

(1976).
46. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302-03.
47. Id. at 303.
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justification for applying heightened scrutiny to the medical school's
affirmative action program. Justice Powell proposed a positive reason
for strict scrutiny, but it revolved around institutional concerns, more
specifically the symbolic role of governmental institutions. He argued:
"All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits
on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by
the individuals burdened.... [And they will] be perceived as invidious." 48 "One should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and
the perception of mistreatment that accompanies, ' 49 racial classifications by the government. What Justice Powell implied was that institutions need to be seen as legitimate by the people, and if institutions
appeared to favor one race over others, institutions would lose their
legitimacy. Different treatment by the state works a symbolic harm
.
onto those burdened, inciting them to anger and resentment.
No doubt Justice Powell articulated a truth about race relations in
America and about the role of institutions in society. Many whites do
feel "deep resentment" of affirmative'action plans that distribute benefits on the basis of race or ethnicity.50 This is due to the fact that
people derive and create meaning, in part, through institutions. In
other words, people shape their own identities based on the institutional regimes and practices that surround them.5 1 A voter, for example, may feel that she is an empowered, respected individual with
equal dignity on account of fair and democratic electoral institutions.52 State institutions in particular may have strong symbolic content because people often judge their place in the general society by
the proxy of their involvement in governmental institutions.5 3 In this
regard Justice Powell was correct; institutions do have important symbolic roles, particularly state institutions.
48. Id.at 294 n.34 (emphasis omitted).
49. Id.
50. On the role of "white resentment" in shaping Justice Powell's opinion, see Michael
J.Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L.
Rv. 1023, 1047-48 (1979).
51. Cf DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 251-65 (1990) (analyzing how institutional practices of criminal punishment convey and reinforce cultural meanings); Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 330, 367-78 (1993)
(describing way that electoral institutions "regenerate and reaffirm certain cultural meanings and concepts which are impressed upon and absorbed by [voters]").
52. See Winkler, supra note 51, at 375.
53. One of the reasons this may be is the special charisma that attaches to governmental institutions and actors. See, e.g., CLiFPoRD GEERTZ, Centers, Kings, and Charisma:

Reflections on the Symbolics of Power, in LOCAL

KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRmwE
ANTHROPOLOGY 121-46 (1983); EDWARD SHITs, Charisma, Order,and Status,
in CENTER AND PERIPHERY: ESSAYS IN MACROSOCIOLOGY 256-75 (1975)..
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Yet even so, Justice Powell's analysis was only partial and incomplete. Justice Powell was silent as to how many members of racial and
ethnic minorities feel about the unfairness and symbolic illegitimacy
of governmental institutions as currently constituted. Specifically,
state institutions presently lack legitimacy in many minorities' eyes because institutional officeholders remain overwhelmingly white, with
only token minority contingents. 54 Unless institutions become more
representative of the diverse society in which they operate, they will
not be considered "fair" by racial minorities. Justice Powell, by his
silence to how blacks, for example, might perceive institutions, sacrificed their desire and need for legitimate institutions to calm white
emotions and sentiments.55
Led by these institutional concerns, Justice Powell applied strict
scrutiny to the U.C. Davis medical school's affirmative action plan.56
Justice Powell's analysis of the first prong of strict scrutiny-determining whether the state has a "compelling" end to justify its programrelies on notions of institutions and institutionality. The university
justified its'affirmative action plan by asserting a remedial interest in
"countering the effects of societal discrimination. '5 7 Justice Powell,
however, dismissed this interest as "an amorphous concept of injury," insisting instead that to justify a remedial affirmative action
plan, there must be
judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations. After such findings[,] ... the
governmental interest in preferring [minorities] ... is substantial .... In such a case, the extent of the injury and the
consequent remedy will have been judicially, legislatively, or
administratively defined. Also, the remedial action usually
remains subject to continuing oversight .... 19
Justice Powell thus limited the availability of remedial affirmative action to instances where governmental institutions have made specific
54. Cf HAcKER, supra note 22, at 122 (discussing lack of legitimacy of overwhelmingly
white societal institutions in eyes of many minorities); Duncan Kennedy, A CulturalPluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 Dun L.J. 705, 707 (describing
lack of legitimacy of white institutions of higher education).
55. Perhaps Justice Powell was silent to the perspectives of racial minorities merely for
strategic reasons, aiming to make "diversity" palatable to the dominant white majority. If
so, the strategy is flawed, even if it appears to make race-consciousness more politically
acceptable. See infra notes 217-26 and accompanying text.
56. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
57. Id. at 306.

58. Id. at 307.
59. Id. at 307-08 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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"findings," through appropriate institutional procedures, of past discrimination. In essence there is no discrimination to remedy unless
and until some proper institutional body-the judiciary, legislature, or
administrative agency-makes authoritative findings of discrimination. A particular state institution, such as the university, lacks the
capacity to undertake remedial efforts if a general governmental body
already charged with remedial powers does not order such action and
define the scope of the remedial effort. "[I]solated segments of our
vast governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions . . 60
Again, affirmative action was not acceptable because of the challenges it posed to institutional functionality, reflected in the notion of
the "competen[ce]" of "governmental structures." Whereas earlier he
expressed a concern for the institutional competence of the judiciary,
the dominant concern here was the institutional competence of the
state agency or body adopting affirmative action to be able to detect,
gauge, and remedy the effects of racial discrimination. Even when a
remedial purpose was possible without interfering with institutional
functionality-for example, where there are specific findings of discrimination in violation of the law-Justice Powell insisted on "oversight" by other governmental institutions of the remedial policy's
implementation, evidencing even further dependence upon institutional concerns.61
In rejecting the state's interest in remedying "general societal discrimination," Justice Powell was silent to the interrelatedness of widespread cultural attitudes and institutional discrimination. In
American history, racist cultural ideology has worked to establish and
maintain an entire system of racial inequality, excluding blacks and
other ethnic minorities from many educational, economic, and political opportunities. Though slavery and Jim Crow have been eradicated, the underlying ideology and world-view that enabled these
forms of subordination to arise have not simply perished.62 Many
whites continue to harbor often unrecognized cultural understandings
about blacks that breed assumptions of black inferiority and perpetu-

60. IdL at 309.
61. See idat 308.
62. HACKER, supra note 22, at 14,20-21. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his opinion, the Court has often played a substantial role in perpetuating racist ideology and racial
subordination. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387-94 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ate inequitable treatment.63 "Most blacks have to overcome, when
meeting whites, a set of assumptions older than this nation about
one's abilities, one's marriageability, one's sexual desires, and one's
morality."'6 The ideology of black inferiority results in a range of
harms, from the routine, relatively mild annoyance of taxicab drivers
skipping black fares 65 and salespeople paying "special" attention to
black customers, 66 to the more devastating residential segregation that
results from "white flight"-the phenomenon whereby once approximately ten to twenty percent of a traditionally white neighborhood is
populated by blacks, whites move out in large numbers. 67 Such unconscious racial understandings deeply affect how even the most wellmeaning whites treat blacks in daily life and, of course, in particular
institutional contexts, such as the workplace, the church, or the school.
It is undeniably true that general societal discrimination may at times
be amorphous in its manifestations. But when we see distinctive patterns of activity that correlate to racial identity-such as the endemic
disparity in minority representation in the professions 6 8 -coupled
with America's profound racist history, we know that race is playing a
significant, if not dominant, role in maintaining inequality. Silent to
the prevalence of negative cultural attitudes about race, Justice Powell
required specific institutional "findings" 69 of violations of the law to
justify any state effort to help blacks achieve an already elusive
equality.
63. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317,328-44 (1987) (discussing relationship between unconscious racial stereotypes and racially discriminatory practices).
64. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Casefor Race-Consciousness,91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060,
1066-67 (1991).
65. HACKER, supra note 22, at 20.
66. See Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to Shop
& to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 147, 148-51.
67. HACKER, supra note 22, at 36-38. White flight is discussed further at infra note 213
and accompanying text.
68. HACKER, supra note 22, at 110.
When the Negro child reaches working age, he finds that America offers him
significantly less than it offers his white counterpart. For Negro adults, the unemployment rate is twice that of whites, and the unemployment rate for Negro teenagers is nearly three times that of white teenagers. A Negro male who completes
four years at college can expect a median annual income of merely $110 more
than a white male who has only a high school diploma. Although Negroes repre-

sent 11.5% of the population, they are only 1.2% of the lawyers and judges, 2%
of the physicians, 2.3% of the dentists, 1.1% of the engineers and 2.6% of the
college and university professors.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 395-96 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
69. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
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If Justice Powell's extensive focus on institutions tends to obscure
rather than expose the real life status of the races in America, his
opinion should be recognized for how it provides the doctrinal foundation for affirmative action plans to pass constitutional muster. Justice Powell accomplished this by holding that some racial
classifications can serve compelling governmental interests, and hence
affirmative action may be able to survive the demanding test of strict
scrutiny.70 This is no small achievement in light of the fact that only
once has a state law been able to withstand this exacting form of judicial review under equal protection.71 Professor Gerald Gunther once
famously remarked that the strict scrutiny standard is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."'72 Yet Justice Powell found the medical school's
interest in creating a diverse student body sufficiently compelling to
warrant, at least theoretically, the use of race as a factor in the admissions process.73
Justice Powell found diversity a compelling interest because it
could be tied to institutional concerns, namely the university's institutional mission or mandate. Justice Powell agreed with the medical
school's argument that part of the mission of the university is to provide a student body comprised of diverse people with different backgrounds and experiences, each contributing to the robust marketplace
of ideas necessary in the academic arena.74 Quoting Justice Felix
Frankfurter, Justice Powell stated, "'[1]t is the business of a university
to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. ' '75 Echoing Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes's famous dissent'rng opinion in Abrams v. United States,76 Justice Powell crafted an image of the university as the heart of the marketplace of ideas from which the discovery of "truth" is made possible
by dialogue inclusive

'

"of a multitude of tongues,"

'

",77

each with its

70. ld. at 320.
71. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223-24 (1944) (holding internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II constitutionally permissible under strict
scrutiny).
72. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Cour4 1971 Term-Freword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1972).
73.
74.
75.
(1957)

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
1& at 312-13.
Id. at 312 (emphasis added) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,263
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).

76. 250 U.S. 616, 624, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (articulating marketplace of
ideas metaphor to justify First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech).
77. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).
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own accent and insight. Justice Powell took notice of the fact that
part of any
wide exposure to different ideas and people-diversity-is
78
university's inherent educative mandate.
In recognizing racial identity as a proxy for diversity of experience and perspective, Justice Powell articulated a realistic view of the
different life experiences of blacks and whites in America. The perspectives of the stigmatized "Other" are valuable and deserve expression in the formative arenas of education. 7 9 By including the views of
subordinated groups in academic life, all students will benefit. According to the language of strict scrutiny, diversity is a compelling governmental interest. And in light of Justice Powell's clear conclusion
that the U.C. Davis medical school had no interest in remedying discrimination, either of a general nature-"too amorphous"-or of a
particular one-no findings of specific discriminatory practices-this
integrational purpose passes the first prong of strict scrutiny even
where there is no remedial motivation whatsoever.
If Justice Powell offered a realistic understanding of diversity, his
reach was limited by the institutional notions guiding him. He found
the medical school's admissions plan unconstitutionally overbroad because it reserved a specified number of seats in the entering class only
for minority candidates.8 0 Race consciousness would only be permissible, it seems from Justice Powell's reasoning, when it could fit comfortably into the traditional institutional procedures for decision
making. According to Justice Powell, race could be used as a plus
factor in screening applicants81 in the same way a university used
other traditional, nonquantifiable factors to rate candidates and insure
academic diversity beyond test scores and grade point averages, such
as "exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience," 2 "demonstrated compassion,' '8 3 " 'geographic origin[,] or a life
spent on a farm.' "I Justice Powell here was deeply wrong; the daily
experience of being a member of a stigmatized minority is not
equivalent to a summer job or an ability to play the piano. Ignoring
this error, we can still see the institutional orientation of Justice Pow78. Id. at 312-13.
79. IM. at 312-13 n.48 (citing Princeton University president's description of benefits
derived from diverse student body).

80. See id. at 319-20.
81. Id. at 317-18.
82. Id. at 317.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 316 (quoting with approval Harvard College's diversity-in-admissions
program).
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ell's reasoning. Justice Powell reduced race to a plus factor in order to
make it "fit in" with the existing decision-making procedures of the
university. Race is brought down to the level of work experience because that is a level with which the institution is familiar; race consciousness is only acceptable if it can be envisioned as a normal
"factor" akin to those traditionally used in the usual institutional procedures. Any more substantial consideration of race would be a
deviation from historical decision-making practices and therefore
unwelcome.
Justice Powell's acceptance of traditional decision-making procedures comes without his having questioned or challenged the objectivity and neutrality of such procedures in their real world operation. If
Justice Powell searched beyond the surface of university admissions
procedures, he would find that the decision to admit or reject an applicant often rests on "factors" or "qualifications" other than test scores
and personal experiences that are not tied to academic diversity or a
robust exchange of ideas. As Justice Blackmun noted in his opinion,
universities have long "given conceded preferences up to a point to
those possessed of athletic skills, to children of alumni, to the affluent
who may bestow their largess on the institutions, and to those having
connections with celebrities, the famous, and the powerful."85 It is
thus "somewhat ironic" for Justice Powell to be "so deeply disturbed
over a program where race is an element of consciousness." 6 Justice
Powell failed to reflect on this real-world context, crafting and maintaining an institutional ideal-a vision of the institution of the university abstracted from the social environment in which it operates.
B. Firming Up the Institutional Foundations? City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke first set forth the possibility
that racial classifications in the context of affirmative action would be
subject to strict scrutiny. But his was a solo opinion, and although he
announced the judgment of the Court, the Justices were deeply divided over which equal protection standard should apply. Some disagreed with Justice Powell's view that strict scrutiny ought to apply to
affirmative action and instead argued for a middle-tier approach that
would be more deferential to the state governments in their efforts to
85. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 404 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. Id.
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remedy discrimination against minorities.Y7 It was not until City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 8 that a majority of Justices agreed on
the strict scrutiny standard and cemented that standard into controlling constitutional doctrine.89 Croson's reasoning is also led by institutional concerns related to those first articulated by Justice Powell in
Bakke, but the Croson Court revised and reshaped the content of the
institutional notions invoked.
Richmond's city council adopted an affirmative action plan presumptively requiring thirty percent of all city construction contracts to
be subcontracted out to Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs).90
The law was motivated by the stark fact that despite comprising fifty
percent of the city's population, blacks-via the proxy of minorityowned firms-only received 0.67% of the city's prime contracting
business in prior years. 91 Finding no evidentiary showing of "constitutional or statutory violation by anyone in the Richmond construction
industry,"2 the Court, per Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, held the law
unconstitutional. Without an identifiable history of discrimination
against the advantaged minorities within the particular industry, the
state lacked a sufficiently compelling remedial purpose to justify its
plan under strict scrutiny. 93 Even if a sufficient remedial purpose had
existed, the Court stated that the rigid numerical quota was unconstitutionally overbroad because it did not contain a waiver provision
which would allow whites to obtain city contracts in the event that
MBE bids were artificially high.9 4

Justice O'Connor's analysis of strict scrutiny begins and ends with
institutional concerns. Since Bakke, the Court had wavered between
standards in the few affirmative action controversies it faced, so that it
was not clear from precedent which standard applied. Chief Justice
Burger explicitly refused to characterize his adopted standard as strict
87. This was the approach suggested by JusticesBrennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, who concurred in part and dissented in part in Bakke. See iLat 359 ("[R]acial classifications designed to further remedial purposes '"must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."' ") (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976))).
88. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
89. IaL at 493.
90. Id.at 477-78.
91. Id at 479-80.
92. 1& at 500 (emphasis omitted).
93. Id.at 505.
94. Id at 507-08.
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scrutiny in his Fullilove v. Klutznick 95 opinion upholding a minority

set-aside law for federal contracting.96 Then, a controlling plurality of
Justices applied strict scrutiny to reject an affirmative action plan in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education. 7 In each of these cases, the
Justices vigorously debated which level of equal protection scrutiny
should apply to affirmative action controversies.
Justice O'Connor began in a position similar to Justice Powell's in
Bakke; she first had to defend the Court's choice of the strict scrutiny
standard. But her analysis rests on different institutional concerns and
in some ways turns Justice Powell's analysis on its head. If Justice
Powell had to overcome Justice Stone's equal protection theory of
Carolene Products, Justice O'Connor had to find a way around the
Fullilove decision, where the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a
federal MBE set-aside program similar to the one adopted by the
Richmond city council. Justice O'Connor distinguished Fullilove by
characterizing Chief Justice Burger's choice of standard as intermediate scrutiny, a deferential form of review applicable, according to Justice O'Connor, only to affirmative action laws adopted by Congress,
and not to those adopted by the states.98 The basis for her distinction
was institutional: Congress has a different institutional mission than
the state governments regarding the pursuit of racial equality. 99
" '[I]n no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a
more comprehensive remedial power than in the Congress,' "100 she
stated. "Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce"''1 1 the promise of equal protection and pursue race-conscious affirmative action. That mandate
was the enforcement power embodied in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which gave Congress an identifiable charge to remedy
America's racial injustices by establishing that Congress had a specific
obligation to enforce the guarantees of equal protection and due process.1° The constitutional amendment made the goal of achieving racial equality part of the institutional mandate of Congress; it revised
Congress' charter, the Constitution itself. Lacking this remedial mandate, states that attempt to remedy racial injustice will find their race95. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
96. IM at 492.
97. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
98. Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-91.

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id at 490-91.
Id. at 488 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483).
Id. at 490.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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conscious measures suspect and subject to stricter scrutiny. To Justice
O'Connor, the choice of standard turned on the nature of the institutional mandate of the body enacting affirmative action laws.
By hinging the issue on the respective institutional missions of
Congress and the states, Justice O'Connor let the history of racial subordination by the states pass unseen in the shadows. In the United
States, state and local governments, not the federal government, perpetrated the vast majority of governmental discrimination against stigmatized minorities. Though the federal government cannot claim
immunity from discrimination-witness the history of the armed
forces-the governments of the several states adopted and enforced
the most extensive array of subordinating measures, affecting so many
millions of lives for so long. State governments adopted laws excluding blacks from jury service' 0 3 and prohibiting interracial marriages 1°n
It was local law enforcement that turned a blind eye to lynchings and
hate crimes against blacks. Since the end of the Civil War, the federal
government guaranteed blacks' right to vote by the Fifteenth Amendment, 05 but the states erected barriers to effective voting, such as literacy tests, poll taxes, grandfather clauses, white primaries, and racial
gerrymandering. 10 6 Virginia is no exception to this general phenomenon, having participated actively in the perpetuation of a racial caste
system even after the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education °7 outlawed the most blatant forms of governmental discrimination.'08 Justice Marshall characterized Richmond's recent history of
racial discrimination as "disgraceful."' 1 9 The federal government
most likely has discriminated against far fewer people than the state
and local governments, if for no other reason than the federal government was largely inactive in legislating for the general welfare until
the New Deal. One reason the federal government has some responsibility in achieving racial justice is that the state governments, like
Virginia, have often proven unwilling to extend the promise of equal
103. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879) (holding unconstitutional
West Virginia law banning blacks from jury service).

104. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (holding unconstitutional Virginia law
banning interracial marriage).
105. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
106. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993) (describing state-erected barriers to
black electoral participation).
107. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
108. This history was detailed by Justice Marshall in his Croson dissent. See Croson, 488
U.S. at 544-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. Id.at 544 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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Justice O'Connor's emphasis on the insti-

tutional mandate of Congress vis A vis the states obscures the vividness of this history."'
Having distinguished Fullilove, Justice O'Connor then defended
her choice of strict scrutiny by calling it a way of" 'smok[ing] out' ,,112
perceived impurities in the decision-making processes of institutions
that adopt affirmative action measures. "Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or
'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racialpolitics.""' 3
It is evident how a decision-making procedure would be defective
if explicitly based on stereotypical notions of racial inferiority; few
would argue that the blatant use of racist ideology to disadvantage
and stigmatize minorities does not violate our constitutional commitment to equal protection. Justice O'Connor's second suspect motivation, "simple racial politics,"" 4 was fuzzier and less obvious. Perhaps
her fear was that politicians would attempt to pursue a politics of racial spoils, using the mantle of benign discrimination to take attention
away from their real motive of racial self-dealing.1 5 Justice O'Connor
emphasized that, in the case of Richmond, five of the nine members of
6
the city council who adopted the minority set-aside law were black."
Because a black majority provided an advantage to members of its
own, the Court had special cause to be suspicious that the decision110. See id. at 559-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

111. While severely limiting the ability of states to adopt race-conscious affirmative action laws, Justice O'Connor's analysis seemed to broaden significantly Congress's role in
achieving racial justice. See Kenneth L. Karst, PrivateDiscriminationand Public Responsibility: Patterson in Context, 1989 Sup. Cr.REv. 1, 46-47. For supporters of affirmative
action, however, relying on Congress is a risky proposition, especially in light of hostile
Republican control of both houses. See Steven V. Roberts, Affirmative Action on the
Edge, U.S. NEws & WORLD RnP., Feb. 13, 1995, at 32, 38 (describing efforts under way in
key congressional committees to limit, even ban, affirmative action).
112. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
113. Id (emphasis added).

114. Id. at 510.
115. According to T. Alexander Aleinikoff, a majority of the Court thought that "[a]fter
attaining political power ....
blacks on the city council acted according to one of the oldest
American political traditions of rewarding one's friends out of public coffers." Aleinikoff,
supra note 64, at 1104. Aleinikoff correctly notes that the fear of racial self-dealing was

hinted at by Justice O'Connor, but received more forceful articulation in the concurring
opinions of Justices Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia. See id at 1102-04.
116. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495.
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making process
of the legislative institution was not functioning
17
properly.
The Court's special caution with regard to affirmative action programs adopted by a black majority such as Richmond's city council
may reflect a far too common assumption made by whites concerning
the objectivity and neutrality of blacks. Dominant majorities often
assume that the way they see the world is an accurate and impartial
depiction of reality. 11 Competing perspectives can be brushed aside
as false, biased, or motivated by the desire to seize power." 9 As a
result, blacks are at times assumed by whites to be self-interested and
partial. The problem is accentuated when minorities hold positions of
authority or prominence. When he was a district court judge in Pennsylvania, the Honorable A. Leon Higginbotham experienced this
when a defendant-a union in a race discrimination case-moved to
disqualify the judge because he was black and thus, according to the
defendant, would be predisposed to favor the black plaintiff. 20 The
assumption of the litigant's motion was that a black judge would be
hopelessly subjective and biased while a white one could be objective
and impartial even if the white judge shared racial identity with one of
the litigants.' Similarly, white legislators might be seen as neutral
deliberators of the common good, while black legislators are considered self-interested and self-dealing.
[T]he Court [in Croson] implicitly questions the ability of
black politicians to be "other-directed," interested in improving the condition of disadvantaged members of the community, whatever their race. Any action taken on behalf of
the black community is presumed to be racial self-dealing
and therefore a serious violation of antidiscrimination law.122
Accordingly, actions taken by blacks that benefit blacks are inherently
suspect.' 3
117. I1&at 495-96.

118. See

MARTHA MINow, MAKING ALL THE D=RmFNCE: INCLUSION,

AND AMERICAN LAW

ExcLuSION,

49-74 (1990).

119. See id. at 60-61.
120. See Commonwealth v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, 388 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1974); see also Mmnow, supra note 118, at 61 n.43.
121. In these days of racial animus, it is not surprising that this phenomenon is occasionally reversed and white judges are asked to recuse themselves by black litigants due to
perceived prejudice against blacks. I am indebted to the Honorable James Zagel for sharing his experiences in this regard with me.
122. Aleinikoff, supra note 64, at 1105.
123. This is the view Justice Marshall ascribed to the majority. See Croson, 488 U.S. at
555 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Surely, Justice O'Connor did not intend to buttress the notion
that blacks are inevitably partial and biased while whites can be neutral and objective. Rather, it seems she intended to rest her fear of
impure politics on a broader vision of the political process and of the
Court's role in regulating it. To make this clear, however, Justice
O'Connor invoked Justice Stone's theory from footnote four of
Carolene Products, claiming that "one aspect of the judiciary's role
under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect 'discrete and insular
minorities' from majoritarian prejudice or indifference." 124 Strict
scrutiny should apply to this case, she stated, because of the fact that
the law was passed by one Richmond racial majority-blacks-and
arguably harms a Richmond racial minority-whites. 125 This invocation of CaroleneProducts contrasts sharply with Justice Powell's argument in Bakke that the Court was not in any way bound by the
Carolene Products theory of protecting "discrete and insular minori' because the majority/minority distinction was beyond the pale
ties"126
of judicial competence. 127 By the reasoning of Justice O'Connor,
judges are not only competent to determine who constitutes a "majority" and who a "minority" in Richmond, but it is part of their judicial
function to do so. Making such judgments is part of the basic institutional tasks or duties of judges. Justice O'Connor's acceptance of
CaroleneProducts turned on her view of institutions; like Justice Powell, she was informed by an understanding of the judiciary and of its
institutional role. But the similar themes cannot mask the stark inconsistencies of their reasoning. Justice O'Connor accepted Carolene
Products' rationale for the precise proposition that Justice Powell rejected in Bakke.
Croson's analysis of the significance of Richmond's interests
under the first prong of strict scrutiny continues the institutional argument. The Court rejected Richmond's asserted compelling interest in
remedying general societal discrimination against blacks and other minorities. 28 Suddenly echoing Justice Powell in Bakke, Justice
O'Connor called this too amorphous a justification for race-conscious
affirmative action.' 2 9 The Court held that the body adopting affirmative action must have a "'strong basis in evidence'" to conclude that
124. Id at 495 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938)).
125. Id. at 495-96.
126. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
127. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295:'98 (1978).
128. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
129. Id. at 499.

950

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:923

there has been identifiable involvement by that institution with discriminatory practices in the relevant industry.1 3 1 In other words the
body must have what we might call a particularizedremedialpurpose,
one geared towards remedying discrimination against minorities in the
by the particular institurelevant industry perpetuated or supported
131
consciousness.
race
to
resorting
now
tion
It is not clear exactly how much fault on the part of the institution
is necessary under Croson's analysis. Justice O'Connor did not state
that the institution itself must have had racially discriminatory practices, such as refusing to hire blacks. But the institution must have
some minimal degree of fault; Justice O'Connor said the institution
must itself have been at least a "passive participant" in discrimination
within the industry. 32 In the case of Richmond, the Court held that
the record showed no evidence of even this level of fault, 33 although
Justice Marshall's dissent argued that sufficient evidence was present
in the form of uncontroverted testimony by longtime members of the
Virginia construction industry." 4
Justice O'Connor's analysis illuminates the variety of different institutional missions the Court wavers between in affirmative action
cases. Once again, institutional mandates come to the fore, but this
time they are of a different strain. In Bakke, Justice Powell described
what we might call "inherent" institutional mandates; the medical
school, as an educative institution, had to provide a diverse student
body in order to fulfill its inherent and essential educational purpose. 35 The use of race consciousness was therefore allowable, in
theory, because the school's inherent educational mission meant insuring diversity, including racial diversity. According to the Croson
Court's interpretation of Fullilove, Congress was able to be race conscious because of its "formal" mission embodied in the enforcement
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 Congress can use race
because its charter, the Constitution, was officially amended through
appropriate procedures. 37 This is not an inherent mandate, but a for130. Id. at 500, 510 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
131. See id. at 509.
132. Id. at 492. "Thus, if the city could show that it had essentially become a 'passive
participant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction
industry, we think it clear that the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a

system." Id.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 510.
Id. at 540-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 487.

ApFril 1995]

SOUNDS OF SILENCE

mally adopted one. Then Croson offers another possibility: a mandate imposed on the institution due to its own tortious conduct of
participating in discrimination against minorities. If there is an identifiable history of discriminatory practices in which the institution was
at least a "passive participant," then the institution can now advantage
minorities to compensate for the injury. 138 This "tortious" mandate
attaches to an institution because of its own fault in participating in or
supporting minority subordination..
The Court's requirement of one of these types of institutional
mandates to create a sufficiently weighty governmental interest in affirmative action is prompted in part by the Court's sentiment that racial classification in pursuit of broader social goals, such as remedying
general discrimination in an entire industry, is a slippery slope. "[A]
generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine
the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy. It 'has no logical
stopping point.' "139 But to insist that a governmental interest have a
clear, logical stopping point before it can be considered compelling
does not resonate with constitutional history. The Court has regularly
and frequently characterized numerous interests or objectives of government as compelling without requiring precise boundaries. For example, the Court has not hesitated to argue that state governments
have the utmost weighty interest in such diverse and diffuse ends as
maintaining an intelligent electorate14 and responsibly educating its
citizens.' 4 ' These governmenal ends have few logical stopping points.
Their limits are defined by the rights of those affected by laws enacted
in their pursuit. Yet the Court in Croson skipped this question to focus instead on the adopting institution and its proper role in addressing racial inequity. Even if we assume that the Court in other cases
was correct in calling the maintenance of an intelligent electorate or
the responsible education of the citizenry compelling, 42 it is hard to
see why remedying the racial subordination that has marked Ameri138. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
139. Id.at 498 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275).
140. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-58 (1972).
141. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 221 (1972).
142. Elsewhere, I have examined the Court's legitimation of a state's interest in pursuing an intelligent electorate and have concluded that this governmental end is misplaced in

the American context. See Winkler, supra note 51, at 346-50, 358-63. That critique supports the argument that maintaining an intelligent electorate is not a compelling interest. I
agree with the Court that a state has a weighty interest in educating its citizenry, even
though state-enforced socialization always poses certain risks. Cf West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding unconstitutional mandatory flag salute
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can history and destroyed tens of millions of lives is not equally
weighty.
The particularized remedy theory developed by Croson'sinstitutional analysis rests on faulty and inconsistent beams of support. By
requiring a tie between the specific institution's participation in an industry's discriminatory practices and the availability of affirmative action, the Court indicated that only those institutions that can be said
to have contributed, at least minimally, to discrimination against minorities owe damages to compensate for the harm. One reason for
terming this a tortious mandate is that it is influenced by basic notions
of fault and causation at the core of the private law of torts. Redress
and remedy are intimately tied to attributions of fault and causation.
But these tort law notions do not fit neatly within the fabric of affirmative action, as is apparent if we move beyond the realm of institutions
and into that of the people affected by affirmative action. First, the
real party burdened with paying the "damages" are whites who lose
the opportunity to work on a Richmond contract. These people are,
in the Court's words, "innocent." '4 3 Yet the Court will allow them to
law for public schoolchildren because coerced expressions of patriotism would likely undermine, rather than encourage, respect for American liberties).
143. If the language of white innocence is found throughout the affirmative action cases,
the Court has offered little insight into the substantive content of this idea. See, e.g.,
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298, 307, 310. Before joining the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia expressed his strong resistance to affirmative action on precisely this ground-that many
whites are innocent. See Antonin Scalia, The Diseaseas Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond
Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race," 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147. According to
then-Professor Scalia, most white Americans, as members of immigrant ethnic minorities,
were not culpable for slavery and racial subordination because they "took no part in, and
derived no profit from, the major historic suppression of the currently acknowledged minority groups." Id. at 152.
Even if we could say that most whites never themselves discriminated against minorities, Professor Scalia's claim that white immigrant groups did not benefit from a system of
racial caste is considerably less clear. On one level, whites, especially the immigrant
groups cited by Professor Scalia, did in fact benefit from discrimination in employment
opportunities by not having to compete with blacks, who were often excluded from labor
pools in many industries both north and south of the Mason-Dixon Line. See KENNETH L.
KARST, BELONGING TO

AMERICA:

EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION

166

(1989) (stating that "some of the main beneficiaries of racial discrimination in employment
have been white ethnics"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78, 94 (1986) (stating that "whites have reaped
windfalls from racism: they would not be where they are but for the prior exclusion of
blacks from competition with them"). On another level, whites are advantaged by not
having a stigmatized racial identity that they must confront daily in a hostile world. See
KARsr, supra, at 167. On social and racial stigmas more generally, see ERVING GOFFMAN,
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). On still another

level, because of vast differences in historical legal rights and in present economic, political,
and social clout, one may say that there is a "property right" in "whiteness." See Derrick
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be burdened when there has been a particular history of institutional
discrimination in the relevant industry. But the innocence, or lack of
fault, of these individuals remains constant, whether or not the institution has discriminated. 144

Second, and more significant, is the fact that the tort-bearer is not
the compensated party. The recipients of remedial affirmative action
are minorities living today, regardless of whether they or their relatives were the direct victims of an industry's, or an institution's, dis-

criminatory practices. The only thing that unites the real tortbearers-victims of discrimination by the industry-with today's beneficiaries of remedial affirmative action is racial identity; they are
black. If they share the same race as those who were discriminated
against in the past, they stand to gain from particularized remedial
affirmative action programs as envisioned by Croson. Hence, the
Court's approach ultimately turned on accepting racial identity as the
characteristic that entitled one to damages, not endurance of identifiable acts of victimization by the particular institution or industry. Racial identity serves here as a proxy for status in a stigmatized group-a
characteristic that indicates whether one belongs to a group that has
been victimized generally by racism and discrimination in society.14
Yet, the Court stated earlier that remedying general societal discrimination was too vague a goal. Croson's theory thus turns on itself.
Although the Court attempted to avoid legitimizing affirmative action
intended to remedy general societal discrimination, a look beyond inBell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 1595, 1602-11
(1989); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1707 (1993).
Of course, this discussion emphasizes groups, not individual persons, and hence may
be criticized for failing to prevent harm to real individuals, like Alan Bakke, who would be
made to carry some of the weight of our society's racial'problems. In response, one might
question whether the burden a white individual like Bakke would be made to bear by
affirmative action is even comparable to the burden imposed on black individuals today,
and historically, by the racism of the wider society. See David P. Bryden, On Race and
Diversity, 6 CONST. ComNrArY 383, 419 (1989) ("I don't regard it as a fatal objection
that affirmative action entails sacrificing some innocent white people. It's a high cost, but
not necessarily too high. Not as high as all the suffering blacks had to endure while we
forced them to wait for the opportune times to abolish slavery and segregation.");
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HA v. L. Rav. 1331, 1342 (1988).
144. See Sullivan, supra note 143, at 94.
145. The Court held that the Richmond law was overinclusive because it extended preferential treatment to groups other than blacks, such as Spanish-speakers, Native Americans, Asians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. Croson, 448 U.S. at 506. While it may be correct that
members of those groups have never been victimized by discrimination in the Richmond
construction industry, this only called for narrowing the statute, not striking it down
altogether.
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stitutions reveals that remedying general societal discrimination is inevitable under the court's particularized remedy theory of affirmative
action, so long as racial identity is that which entitles one to
participate. 146
Justice O'Connor's positioning of the institution in this particularized remedy theory may be similarly inappropriate because she conceives of affirmative action as punishment for improper past behavior
by the institution. But this tort-law-inspired notion fails to account for
the fact that many institutions that adopt affirmative action do so willingly and voluntarily; indeed, they are often benefited by adopting
such policies. Affirmative action generally means bringing more diverse people into the institution's practices and integrating its
workforce; "diversity is good business,"'147 not severe punishment.
Any institution may want to eliminate the costly inefficiencies of racism, prejudice, and intolerance which create barriers to the recognition of quality, talent, and opportunity and hinder economic growth.
Some commentators have taken this possibility to mean that we can
eliminate civil rights laws and rely on the open market, in its never
ending quest for efficiency, to bring about racial equality. 48 Yet, race
often infects our rational decision making at the subconscious level,
influencing how we see the world and determine value. By subtly affecting how we calculate costs and benefits, racism hinders the effectiveness and efficiency of the market. Acculturated notions of the
worth and capability of members of stigmatized racial groups impact
many of our daily judgments from whether we think a job applicant
"fits in," to whether we believe a candidate for elected office has the
right "character."' 149 Such unspoken cultural assumptions and value
146. Affirmative action could be retooled by emphasizing class instead of race, benefitting those who are economically disadvantaged no matter what their skin color. Such an
approach would respond to the popular criticism of today's affirmative action that it is
unfair to give preferential treatment to, say the children of black doctors in Beverly Hills
while denying it to the children of the white rural poor. But this criticism and the response
to it are misguided. They misstate the purpose of affirmative action, confusing economic
equalization with compensation for the direct and indirect victims of racial discrimination.
Affirmative action does not benefit blacks as a group simply because they are poor; it aides
them because as a group they have been subordinated due to their racial identity. Furthermore, poor white people do not face life with a stigmatized identity, as even the black child
of a Beverly Hills doctor must.
147. See Roberts, supra note 111, at 37 (quoting James Wall, National Director of
Human Resources for management consulting firm of Deloitte & Touche LLP: "If you
don't use the best of all talent, you don't make money.").
148. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, FoRBIDDEN GRoutNs: Tim CASE AGAiNST EM.
PLOYMENT DISCRIMNA-ION LAWS 9 (1992).
149. See Lawrence, supra note 63, at 343.
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judgments promise to be diluted, if at all, by full integration of the
stigmatized
into the community's economic, social, and political
life.'5 0
Finally, the Croson Court's reasoning struck a dissonant chord
due to the opinion's earlier favoring of formal institutional mandates
over institutional fault in distinguishing state from federal affirmative
action laws. There, Justice O'Connor deferred more readily to Congress in remedying discrimination, despite the arguably greater fault
of the states in perpetuating the system of racial caste. Here, however, she made degrees of fault the basis for distinguishing among institutions, holding that only those with some minimal culpability can
enact affirmative action. This unreasoned shift in focus helps to undermine Justice O'Connor's institutional analysis, bearing witness to
its illogics and inconsistencies.
C. Shaw v. Reno: A Culmination of Sorts
The Supreme Court recently revisited the problem of race consciousness in Shaw v. Reno. 5 ' At issue in Shaw was North Carolina's
oddly-shaped twelfth congressional district, drawn by the state to create a "majority-minority" district-that is, one in which blacks constituted a majority of the voters.' 5 In the aftermath of the 1990
census,' 53 the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division required the North Carolina legislature to draw this majority-minority district, having previously rejected, pursuant to section five of
the Voting Rights Act (VRA),154 North Carolina's first redistricting
plan because the plan provided for only a single majority-minority district.'
A second majority-minority district was necessary under the
VRA "'to give effect to black and Native American voting
strength.' ,1'16 The forceful position of the Assistant Attorney General was sparked by North Carolina's awful record of discrimination in
politics and elections; blacks constituted twenty percent of the popula150. See, eg., Karst, supra note 111, at 9-11 (arguing that promise of equal citizenship
depends upon racial integration at all levels of society, but particularly at workplace, so
that acculturated notions of racial stigma can be diminished).
151. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
152. Id. at 2819-21.

153. Id. at 2819.
154. I&at 2820.
155. Id.
156. Id (quoting Attorney General's report appended to Brief for Federal Appellees at
10a-11a).
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tion, 157

yet not a single black representative had been elected to Congress this century.158 Creating the first majority-minority district was
not difficult, but the second district was troublesome because, outside
of the first black district, blacks were not sufficiently concentrated in
any one discrete geographical area.' 59 To comply with the federal order, North Carolina drew a long, serpent-like district that was in
places no wider than an interstate highway it followed in order to connect dispersed pockets of urban black voters.160 North Carolina's redistricting resulted in the election of the state's first two black
congressional representatives since Reconstruction, one from each of
the two majority-minority districts.' 6 '
The Court in Shaw held that white voters could pursue a cause of
action challenging race-conscious districting as violative of their rights
to equal protection. 62 In so doing, the Court remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings to determine if white voters
in North Carolina did in fact suffer infringements of their constitutional rights.' 63 The Court held that the district court, on remand, was
to apply strict scrutiny," 6 and although not required by the procedural
posture of the case, the Court offered a lengthy discussion of how
strict scrutiny should work in the context of electoral redistricting. 165
The opinion gave every indication that North Carolina's twelfth congressional district would not survive this standard's rigorous
demands. 66
At its core Shaw is an affirmative action case. The state created
the majority-minority district to give blacks a measure of political
equality that a discriminatory electoral system had long denied them.
North Carolina had been race conscious in drawing district lines and
had sought specifically to advantage blacks-not unfairly, but rather
to meet the demands of political fairness required by the VRA and,
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
159. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mic. L. REv. 588, 590-91 (1993).
160. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
161. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2832.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 2830, 2832.
165. See id. at 2824-26.
166. On remand the district court held that North Carolina's electoral districting scheme
was constitutional, even under strict scrutiny. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408
(E.D.N.C. 1994). It is hard to imagine that the district court's decision will be upheld on
appeal in light of the strong language of the Supreme Court in Shaw.
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more directly, the Assistant Attorney General. Concerns similar to
those guiding the Court in Bakke and Croson influenced the Court in
Shaw, though we also find inconsistencies and reconfigurings of the
institutional principles and conceptions used by the Court. Again we
see the overwhelming emphasis on institutions and again we find disturbing silences to race and the real world context in which American
institutions operate.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Shaw began with
more promise than the earlier affirmative action opinions, as she recounted a devastating tale of America's history of racial subordination.16 7 She recounted how even after the Fifteenth Amendment
formally extended the right to vote to blacks, state efforts to maintain
blacks in a subordinate position systematically disenfranchised
them. 68 Justice O'Connor reminded us that the states perpetuated
racial discrimination in politics through a host of instruments "'both
subtle and blunt,' ,,169 such as literacy tests, good character requirements, and unfair political gerrymandering. 170 Drawing on examples
from Mississippi to Alabama, Justice O'Connor recognized the sorry
history of white electoral exclusion of blacks.
Justice O'Connor's version of history was, however, primarily an
institutional one. It was not a history of people or experiences or
events, but one of institutional practices-what institutional measures
diluted blacks' right to vote. Perhaps we should not be surprised to
find history that focuses on institutions, but what remains most disconcerting is that Justice O'Connor did not draw connections between
past and present. She told the story as if it were only history, using
exclusively the past tense. She corralled racism into the realm of history. One finds no mention of the continuing racial inequities in today's political arena resulting from two hundred years of black
political exclusion. Blacks are still woefully underrepresented in gov-

167. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2822-23. This is a story which has only rarely found its way
into the opinions of the Court. Even the Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), lacked any real discussion of our history of race relations,
focusing instead on a clinical discussion of the psychological and economic effects of school

segregation on minorities.
168. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2822-23.

169. 1& at 2822 (quoting James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectiveson the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA.
L. REv. 633, 637 (1983)).
170. Id.
at 2823.
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ermnent, particularly the federal government. 171 North Carolina's
black population is no exception. Yet for Justice O'Connor, the patterns of racial discrimination in the electoral arena were not present
realities but merely past practices.
The plaintiffs in Shaw claimed to have a "constitutional right to
participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process." 72 Their invocation of
the principle of colorblindness-complete governmental ignorance of
race-echoes a chord that from time to time has been struck in constitutional decisions. 73 But Justice O'Connor quickly explained that the
Court has never imposed a constitutional requirement of colorblindness on government action;' 7 4 certainly neither Bakke nor Croson articulated such a principle, though they did purport to limit the
instances in which government can be race conscious. Justice
O'Connor straightforwardly admitted that "the legislature always is
aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age,
economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of
other demographic factors."' 75
The principle that the Shaw Court adopted in lieu of colorblindness has a distinctly institutional orientation. Justice O'Connor
crafted what we might call a "nonexclusivity principle" for institutional decision making.1 76 Rather than enforcing pure ignorance of
race, the opinion allows states to be race conscious in electorial districting so long as race is not the exclusive factor on which district
lines are drawn. Justice O'Connor stated that the problem with North
Carolina's twelfth congressional district was that "it rationally can be
171. For an analysis of black representation in Congress, see CAROL M. SWAiN, B.AcX

FACES,

BLAcK

IrmRsrs (1993). Swain includes a history of black electoral success-or,

more accurately, electoral frustration. See id at 20-44.

172. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
173. The most famous claim for a "color-blind constitution" was that of the first Justice
John Marshall Harlan in his eloquent dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). For an analysis of the birth of this constitutional concept, see ANDREW KuLL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONsrrruION (1992).
174. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2824. "Despite their invocation of the ideal of a 'color-blind'
Constitution, appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always

unconstitutional. That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-conscious

state decision making is impermissible in all circumstances." Id.(citations omitted); see

also David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. Cr. Rtv. 99 (arguing that

race-consciousness, not colorblindness, animates antidiscrimination law).
175. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2826.
176. Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi have noticed this principle in Shaw, referring to
it as a principle of "value pluralism." See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Micx. L. Rnv. 483, 499-506 (1993).
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viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting,
without regardfor traditionaldistrictingprinciples.' 77 Distinguishing
cases in which the Court approved of race-conscious districting, Justice O'Connor argued that in those earlier instances, the state had
"'employ[ed] sound districting principles such as compactness and
population equality'" and the minorities had "'residential patterns
[which] afford[ed] the opportunity of creating districts in which they
[would] be in the majority.' "178 According to Shaw, race consciousness is acceptable so long as the traditional factors on which institutional decision making has been based are not ignored. While Justice
O'Connor admitted that some use of race consciousness may be inherent in districting, 7 9 she insisted that districting which ignores tradi-

tionally relevant criteria such as compactness and contiguity 8 ' in
favor of race raised a constitutional controversy.' 8 '
Shaw's principle of nonexclusivity rests firmly on a concern for
institutional decision-making processes. The principle was designed
to insure that such processes are not interfered with by an overwhelming reliance on race as a factor in allocating institutional resources. As
such, it was linked to a concern for institutional functionality. Justice
O'Connor appeared to fear that exclusive reliance on race in districting would undermine the effective and proper functioning of representative democratic institutions. 18 Justice O'Connor did not base
her argument, however, on the obvious proxy for gauging the functional effectiveness of representative institutions in voting rights cases:
vote dilution. Vote dilution occurs when electoral districts are drawn
to reduce the relative voting power of identifiable groups of voters
below their approximate percentage of the relevant population. 83 As
Justice White argued in his Shaw dissent, accepted voting rights concepts of injury did not support the white plaintiffs' cause of action
because the plaintiffs could not show that North Carolina's districting
177. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (emphasis added).
178. IM.at 2829 (quoting United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 (1977)) (emphasis omitted).

179. Id. at 2826.
180. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 176, at 500-01. Traditional districting principles
might also include "ensur[ing] effective representation for communities of interest....
reflect[ing] the political boundaries of existing jurisdictions, and ... provid[ing] a district
whose geography facilitates efficient campaigning and tolerably close connections between
officeholders and citizens." Id. at 500.
181. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824-25.

182. Id at 2827.
183. See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights AcL" A Brief History, in CONTROVERsins IN MmorrY VOTING 7,24-27 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).

960

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:923

scheme unfairly diluted the voting power of whites. "Whites constitute roughly 76 percent of the total population and 79 percent of the
voting age population ....Yet, under [North Carolina's] plan, they
still constitute a voting majority in 10 (or 83 percent) of the 12 congressional districts."'" Their votes not having been unfairly diluted,
the white plaintiffs could not show that the proper functioning of the
electoral institutions was interfered with under accepted principles of
voting rights.
The Court rejected Justice White's position, emphasizing a novel
version of institutional functionality in the context of voting.
"[R]eapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything
other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race ... threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling
to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather
than their constituency as a whole."' 85 Due to this signaling effect,
"elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent ohly the members of that group."' 86 Justice
O'Connor thus articulated a belief that racial gerrymandering infects
the connection between representative and represented, hindering the
proper functioning of electoral institutions.
Justice O'Connor's notion of a corrupt electoral connection recalled the fear of racial self-dealing she hinted at in Croson. Blacks in
elected office who represent a racially gerrymandered district would
only represent black interests, unconcerned with the general welfare
of their constituency. Once again, blacks seem to be viewed as incapable of being other-directed, hopelessly bound to self-interested power
politics. Beyond this unfortunate notion, Justice O'Connor's view of
electoral institutions was problematic because it reflected an idealized
version of electoral politics that failed to correspond with American
experience. The reality is that elected representatives always respond
more to some constituencies among their voting populations than to
others. Representatives from districts in which the predominant industry is farming obviously pay more attention to the demands of that
portion of their constituency, even if other constituents favor opposing
policies. No doubt legislators in districts heavy with military defense
contracting firms will guide their votes and policies by the demands of
that constituency, despite the fact that some residents of the same jurisdiction might strongly oppose such positions. Though we often as184. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J.,
dissenting).
185. Id. at 2828.
186. IM at 2827.
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pire for legislators devoted to the common good, elected officials also
should be "representatives" of their jurisdictions, fighting for the interests of their dominant constituencies. This is an inherent feature of
American representative democracy, yet Justice O'Connor mistook it
for a corrupting influence on the operation of the institutions of
government.
Justice O'Connor might respond that when it comes to race, the
same rules do not apply. While any political jurisdiction will have
competing constituencies among its populace regarding policy positions, it is inappropriate to posit that racial minorities, qua racial minorities, will take identifiably consistent political positions and have
distinct political interests. Justice O'Connor indicated something like
this when she condemned racial gerrymandering because
[i]t reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group-regardless of their age, education, economic status,
or the community in which the [sic] live-think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. 18 7
If drawing a connection between racial identity and political interests is an "impermissible racial stereotype," Justice O'Connor was
herself guilty of this sin. Why would it be, as she recognized earlier,
that a legislature "always is aware of race when it draws district lines,
just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors"? 188 Legislators
pay attention to demographic factors such as race and economic status
precisely because those factors correspond with political attitudes and
preferred policy positions. This is not a sign of racial bigotry, but reflects instead a realistic portrait of political life. Indeed, members of
racial minority groups, particularly blacks, often share a high uniformity of interests and assume similar policy positions-even despite economic or other demographic variance. 8 9

A further incoherence marked Justice O'Connor's reasoning with
regard to the electoral connection, for her theory logically depended
187. Id.

188. Id. at 2826 (emphasis omitted).
189. See MIcHAEL C. DAWSON, BnHInD

THE MuLE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICANAMERICAN PoLITcs (1994) (arguing that, despite more economic diversity, blacks remain

politically cohesive, likely due to their perceptions of "linked fates" as members of
subordinated caste); cf Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
and the Theory of Black ElectoralSuccess, 89 MicH. L. REv. 1077, 1112-13 (1991) (collecting sources showing racial bloc voting).
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on a link between racial identity and political beliefs. To say that
black legislators in racially gerrymandered districts would respond
only to black constituents assumes that black constituents are an identifiable political group sufficiently coherent so that they can be responded to by officials. If blacks do not have interests distinct from
those of whites, then a legislator will have trouble attempting to represent blacks as a discrete group at the expense of other constituents.
Emphasizing an idealized vision of electoral institutions, Justice
O'Connor's argument was ensnared by the racial reality it attempted
to ignore.
The real world political environment inhabited by black officeholders also mitigates against O'Connor's view of the political divisiveness of race-based districting.
Even in cities where blacks attain electoral success, they are
still unlikely to possess major economic power .... Black
officials, therefore, must constantly be aware of how their
behavior affects dominant white economic and political
forces, who may well view affirmative action [and other policy choices uniquely benefiting blacks] as being against their
interests. 190
Due to sheer numbers, black representatives will be able to accomplish little for any portion of their constituency unless they form and
maintain coalitions with white representatives-something white representatives do not have to do with blacks. Consequently, black representatives have to be attuned to the needs and demands of whites, in
both their districts and elsewhere, if they are to attain any substantive
goals. 191 The effects of racially gerrymandered districts will not likely
be those assumed by Justice O'Connor.
While repeating some of the institutional concerns of Bakke and
Croson, the Shaw Court quietly slipped over one of the central principles of those earlier decisions' institutional analyses. According to the
earlier decisions, race consciousness was possible if it could be shown
that a race-conscious policy was part of the institution's mandate.
Though the Court wavered on the type of mandate necessary, variously accepting inherent, formal, or tortious missions, the idea of an
190. Aleinikoff, supra note 64, at 1105.
191. Black electoral "gains are almost always the gratuitous dividends of policies favored by a controlling white interest or group. When no such fortuitous arrangements are
possible, blacks have found political participation quite difficult and unrewarding." DERRiCK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELusIVE QuEsr FOR RACIAL JusTICE 96
(1987); see also Guinier, supra note 189, at 1116-25 (describing inability of black elected
officials to assert political power without forming coalitions with whites).
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institutional mandate was key.19 The Shaw Court however virtually
ignored the notion of institutional mandate established in the earlier
cases. If the Court had been attentive to its own requirement of institutional mandate, it surely would have found that North Carolina had
a compelling governmental interest supporting its electoral race consciousness. One might say that a state government has an inherent
responsibility to provide electoral mechanisms that accord all its citizens the equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice;
otherwise, it is difficult to say those mechanisms provide for autonomous self-government. In addition, North Carolina has a formal mandate embodied in the VRA, federal law enacted under the
constitutional authority of the enforcement power of the Fourteenth
Amendment-the very same provision that Croson read to require
deferential judicial review of race consciousness. 93 There is little
doubt that North Carolina had a tortious institutional mandate stemuing from its own identifiable culpability in racial discrimination. A
variety of North Carolina's electoral mechanisms, such as literacy
tests 94 and electoral districting, 95 historically have deprived blacks of
fair representation, making North Carolina an active participant in an
identifiable history of discrimination. And there could be no evidentiary problems; there have been unambiguous legislative and judicial
findings of specific statutory and constitutional violations in North
Carolina's electoral system.' 96 Indeed, the only reason North Carolina was involved in drawing majority-minority districts in the first
place was because the state had a history of electoral discrimination
which subjected it to the provisions of the VRA.' 97 Yet the Shaw
192. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
193. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
194. It was North Carolina's literacy test that was challenged in Lassiter v. Northampton

Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (upholding constitutionality of literacy tests). Recognizing
discrimination where the Court would not, Congress subsequently outlawed literacy tests
in the Voting Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa.
195. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (holding North Carolina's 1982 dis-

tricting scheme violative of Voting Rights Act because it diluted black voting strength). In
Gingles, the district court specifically found a long history of official racial discrimination
in North Carolina's electoral system. See id. at 38-39.
196. See, eg., id. Forty of North Carolina's 100 counties were covered under the original Voting Rights Act of 1965. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820; see Voting Rights Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965)).
197. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 38-39. When it did consider North Carolina's legal duty under
the Voting Rights Act to enhance black representation, the Shaw Court insisted that "a
reapportionment plan that satisfies § 5 [of the Act] still may be enjoined as unconstitutional." See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831. True, but under Justice O'Connor's own interpretation of Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the question of constitutionality when
the federal government enforces a race-conscious remedy is supposed to be governed not
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Court was incoherently silent to the institutional mandates that
proved so persuasive in earlier cases.
The Court was distracted from many of these difficulties perhaps
by nothing more than the appearance of the congressional district.
Certainly, Justice O'Connor described how the strange shape of the
twelfth district was "bizarre"'19 and "dramatically irregular."' 199
"[R]eapportionment," she stated, "is one area in which appearances
do matter." 00 But the concern for appearances was itself motivated
by a perception that the oddly shaped district disrupted traditional
institutional arrangements. Justice O'Connor clearly expressed the
Court's dissatisfaction over the district's lines which were drawn with
little regard for existing geographical boundaries or political subdivisions.20 ' Justice O'Connor explained that the district
is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length,
no wider than the 1-85 [highway] corridor. It winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and
manufacturing areas "until it gobbles in enough enclaves of
black neighborhoods."... Of the 10 counties through which
District 12 passes, five are cut into three different districts;
even towns are divided.202
According to the Court, existing jurisdictional boundaries ought to be
maintained and preserved in the drawing of congressional districts.
The rhetorical flourish that "even towns are divided"20 3 only highlights the absurdity of the "snake-like" district.2 4
If Justice O'Connor was attuned to existing geographical and
demographic configurations, she remained silent to how racism, prejudice, and discrimination have contributed to, and continue to influby strict scrutiny, but by the more deferential intermediate scrutiny standard. In Shaw, the
federal government forced North Carolina to adopt the race-conscious districting to remedy a history of electoral inequality. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. Specifically, it was the
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights acting under the express authority of the congressionally enacted Voting Rights Act, the epitome of a law adopted to "enforce" the
guarantee of equal protection. The Assistant Attorney General had previously rejected
North Carolina's earlier electoral districting plan because it contained only one black majority-minority district and hence provided for inadequate black representation. Id.
198. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825-26 (repeating then agreeing with plaintiffs' characterization of district's shape).
199. Id. at 2820.
200. Id. at 2827.
201. Id. at 2821, 2827.
202. Id. at 2820-21 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476-77 (E.D.N.C. 1992)
(Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (citations omitted).
203. Id. at 2821.
204. Id.
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ence, the composition of populations in regions, counties, cities, and,
yes, towns. Throughout American history racial considerations and
exclusionary efforts against blacks have affected the drawing of municipal and county borders." 5 Moreover, if the twelfth district
"snake[s]" through existing jurisdictional boundaries to "gobble up"
enclaves of blacks, it is due to the severe residential segregation of
blacks which relegates most to isolated urban areas with high concentrations of black residents. As sociologists Douglas S. Massey and
Nancy A. Denton argue in their influential study American Aparthied:
206
Segregation and the Making of the Underclass:
No group in the history of the United States has ever experienced the sustained high level of residential segregation that
has been imposed on blacks in large American cities for the
past fifty years. This extreme racial isolation did not just
happen; it was manufactured by whites through a series of
self-conscious actions and purposeful institutional arrangements that continue today.20 7
While other ethnic groups have been able to integrate white
neighborhoods with relative success, over the past century blacks have
found themselves increasingly separated into segregated residential
enclaves.208 This pattern does not result from natural socioeconomic
factors, nor from black preferences; it stems from white prejudice.
This prejudice has operated on numerous levels to create residential
segregation. In the first half of this century, a variety of zoning
laws,20 9 restrictive covenants, 210 and outright measures of physical violence prevented blacks from moving into white neighborhoods. 211
Though the Supreme Court has since taken a strong constitutional
stand against these forms of discrimination,21 2 the lingering effects of
205. Cf.Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of
Oppression: PolicyArguments Masqueradingas Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162, 188
(1994) ("No one who has lived through a political annexation fight in the South believes
that those decisions are made free of race- and class-based interests.").
206. DouGLAs S. MASSEY & NANcY A. DENTON, AMERICANA AARTim: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). Massey and Denton thoroughly de-

tail the concentration and isolation of blacks in American cities, showing that deliberate
segregation has contributed to persistent poverty among blacks.
207. Id.at 2.
208. IL at 21, 48, 71 (comparing black-white residential isolation and segregation
indices).
209. Id at 35-36.
210. Id.at 36-37.
211. Id at 34-35.
212. For instance, the Court struck down racially restrictive covenants in 1948. See
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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this discrimination still contribute to racial isolation because residential patterns tend to shift very gradually. Moreover, racial isolation is
exacerbated by continuing white prejudice in new and subtler forms,
such as "white flight," whereby whites tend to move out of residential
areas in high numbers once approximately ten to twenty percent of
their neighbors are black.213 And this phenomenon is not limited to
any economic or social class; wealthy blacks find themselves just as
isolated as poor ones. 4 Studies show that black home seekers also
face widespread discrimination by realtors, mortgage lenders, and sellers,215 despite the prohibitions of the Fair Housing Act.216
Of course, no one would demand that the Court solve all these
problems in an electoral districting case. Yet, neither should the
Court bow to traditional boundary lines; we should be well aware that
they too are shaped by racism. But the Court never turns a critical
eye to the prevailing institutional arrangements, accepting them instead as neutral, objective, natural boundaries deserving of respect.
Ultimately, recognition of this racial reality provides the best justification for a discourse that moves beyond institutions. Our institutional structures are built on the foundation of existing social
orderings and relationships. They are not ideal types, perfectly created from our imaginings and aspirations; they are historical creatures
that emerge not so much from creative genius, but from prevalent patterns of human social behavior. If the attitudes of the society in which
an institution develops include racial subordination and racial group
exclusion, it should be little surprise that racism will influence the institutional arrangements formed. But as the Court reasons from institutions, presupposing that they are ideal types or operate in a neutral
manner, it forgets to look at the way social life affects institutional
regimes and mechanisms. Consequently, the regimes take on the appearance of the "norm"-both in terms of our expectation and in
terms of our assessments of value. Hence, the Court does not feel it
necessary to justify deference to institutions. But a closer, more critical look indicates that American institutions are often infected by the
racism of our past and, more troubling still, our present.
213. See HACKER, supra note 22, at 37-38. For an analysis of "white flight," see William
H. Frey, Black In-Migration, White Flight,and the ChangingEconomic Base of the Central
City, 85 AM. J. Soc. 1396 (1980). For a description of the racial attitudes of whites that
give rise to "white flight," see MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 206, at 88-96.

214.

HACKER,

supra note 22, at 37-38.

215. MAssEY & DENTON, supra note 206, at 96-109.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
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Ill. CONCLUSION
Amidst all the silences engendered by the Court's focus on institutions in affirmative action cases, there is one pervasive silence that
the Court has promoted throughout, one which stops institutional actors from openly admitting the use of race consciousness in their decisions to distribute governmental benefits and burdens. Under the
Court's affirmative action doctrine, some affirmative action plans can
pass the demanding constitutional test of strict scrutiny, and hence can
use race consciousness constitutionally. Even here, however, the
Court encourages institutions to keep the use of race quiet, to hide the
role of race in institutional decision making. The Court's opinions
suggest that institutions ought to strive to make it seem like something
else is going on.
This situation began in Bakke, where Justice Powell argued that
in lieu of an explicit separate admissions procedure, the medical
school should use a policy like Harvard College's, where race is used
as a subjective, unquantifiable plus factor. "The applicant who loses
out.., to another candidate receiving a 'plus' on the basis of ethnic
background... would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment
'218 and therefore
...
.,"217 A plus factor is "nonobjective
hard to detect. If race was used in this way-silently, undetectably-it posed
less of a constitutional dilemma. In Croson, the Court's requirement
of waiver provisions in minority set-asides also promised to keep the
public discussion hushed.2 1 9 Race consciousness, when allowed, must
take an imprecise and ambiguous form-making it difficult to perceive the motivations for any single institutional decision. In Shaw,
the effort to keep racial considerations under wraps culminated in the
Court's refusal to condemn race-conscious districting so long as it
complied with traditional districting notions, such as compactness,
contiguity, and existing political subdivisions. 2 0 If the state can hide
the recourse to race by drawing a "normal"-looking district, the constitutional problem of race consciousness would be averted.
In each of these cases, the Court invited institutions to remain
silent with regard to how they use race. Perhaps this silence is strategic, an effort to allow race consciousness while mitigating white re217.
218.
219.
220.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978).
Id
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989).
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826-30 (1993).
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sentment.221 The political strength of affirmative action has always
been precarious and the explicit use of race threatens to spark a political backlash. But if this strategy has motivated the Court, it is fair to
say, in light of current events, that the strategy has not succeeded. We
can hide race, but we cannot stop its discovery. The law school at
Georgetown learned this lesson the hard way, after years of admitting
minority students under the Bakke-approved "plus factor" approach.
The school was embarrassed when a law student, who worked part
time in the administrative offices and had access to the files, publicized the average LSAT scores and grade point averages of recently
admitted minority students, which were lower than the required averages for whites to gain admission. 2 When discovered, the fact that
race had been used quietly to help minorities get into the law school
only made the affirmative action more controversial. Secrets are
rarely kept for long and, once revealed, cause more disruption for the
fact of their having been hidden.
Sweeping race consciousness under the rug has also failed to
make affirmative action more palatable in broader political arenas.
Due to the political revolution of 1994, when Republicans were swept
into national office en masse, finally gaining a majority in the House
after almost five decades of Democratic dominance, 22 affirmative action faces a strong backlash. 224 While Congress considers banning
race-conscious affirmative action altogether, 22 conservative activists
in California are launching a drive to put an initiative on the 1996
general ballot which would outlaw state-sanctioned racial preferences. 1 6 The assault on affirmative action is still just gathering steam;
if the strategy was to save race consciousness by hiding it, then the
strategy has backfired.
Not only do the affirmative action cases endorse this brand of
racial silence, but they also provide us with ample illustration of how
we should not deal with racial issues. Following the Court's lead, we
can choose to talk about something like institutions, making their sins,
221. Without endorsement, Kenneth Karst has posited the possibility of this strategic
motivation in the Court's affirmative action cases. See Karst, supra note 111, at 45-46.
222. See Michel Marriott, White Accuses Georgetown Law School of Bias in Admitting
Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1991, at A13.
223. See Adam Clymer, The 1994 Elections: Congress the Overview; G.O.P. Celebrates
its Sweep to Power, N.Y. TINEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al; Joe Klein, The New New Deal,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1995, at 18.
224. See Roberts, supra note 111, at 38.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 32, 37.
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and not our own, the subject of controversy. Perhaps reasoning from
institutions is not inevitably illogical and incoherent. But if Bakke,
Croson, and Shaw are any indication, we should make a different
choice, for more direct, forthright, and open speech. For it seems unlikely that we will ever get far in the pursuit of racial equality if we
ignore the dilemmas posed by our nation's troubled history and imperfect cultural and social norms. Racial justice is one area in which
we need less silence and more speech-by judges and, indeed, by the
rest of us as well.
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